



# Settlements Issues Forum

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*Q1 2014 Meeting*

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# Settlements Topics and Issues



Upcoming Settlement/Market Changes

- Regulation Market
- Energy Market Offer Flexibility (EMOF) & Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) Redesign



Implemented Market Changes – Update

- Winter 2013/14 Reliability Program



Divisional Accounting Update



Informational Items – Forum dates for 2014



Discussion, Q&A

# UPCOMING MARKET CHANGES



## Regulation Market

- Energy Market Offer Flexibility  
& Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) Redesign



# Regulation Market Changes (Order No. 755)

*May 21, 2014\**

- Joint ISO-NE/NEPOOL FERC Filing
- Objectives
  - Use separate, uniform prices for regulation capacity and service
  - Provide two-part compensation based on those uniform prices

**Joint ISO-NE/NEPOOL FERC Filings**  
*Regulation Market Changes*

[ER12-1643-001](#)

[ER12-1643-003](#)

**Markets Committee Presentation**  
*ISO New England Manual M-REG*

[Mar 12-13 Markets Committee presentation Agenda Item 3](#)

*\* Pending FERC approval*

# Regulation Market Changes

## *Changes for Regulation Service Providers*

- Market Participants will have the ability to submit two-part offers for generation or alternative technology regulation resources
  - Regulation Capacity (Includes opportunity cost)
  - Regulation Service
- Determination of separate uniform clearing prices
  - Regulation Capacity
  - Regulation Service ( “mileage”)
- Regulation providers will be paid on the two clearing prices
  - Both payments subject to certain adjustments for performance
    - Performance evaluated within expected bandwidth tolerances
    - See ISO Operations presentation at [Regulation Monitor Training](#)
  - Make whole payment if applicable
  - Capacity to Service Ratio (“Q” factor) eliminated
- Regulation self schedule concept eliminated

# Regulation Market Changes

## *Charges and Settlement Reporting*

- Regulation charges allocated pro-rata on hourly Real-Time Load Obligation
  - Same as current market design
- Regulation payments and charges will be reported on new Market Information Server (MIS) Settlement reports
  - Current MIS reports will be retired
    - SD\_REGDTLASM and SR\_REGASM
  - MIS Report Descriptions for new reports will be issued at least 30 days in advance of market implementation
    - SD\_REGDTL and SR\_REGSUM
    - Divisional Accounting included

# UPCOMING MARKET CHANGES



- Regulation Market
- ➔ Energy Market Offer Flexibility  
& Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) Redesign



# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *Reliability and Resource Performance Market Changes*

- Address concerns related to:
  - Reliability and market efficiency issues resulting from the increased reliance on natural gas
  - Resource performance during stressed conditions
- Previous market changes include:
  - Day Ahead Market Acceleration
  - Forward Reserve Market revisions
  - Generation Auditing requirements
  - Winter 2013/2014 Reliability Program
  - Forward Capacity Market Shortage Event Trigger

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

*December, 2014*

- Joint ISO-NE/NEPOOL FERC Filings
- Allow Market Participants to submit hourly supply offers, and revise supply offers in Real-Time during the Operating Day
- Revise NCPC calculations to account for Energy Market Offer Flexibility

**Joint ISO-NE/NEPOOL FERC Filing**  
*Energy Market Offer Flexibility*

[Offer Flexibility – ER13-1877-000](#)

[NCPC Redesign – ER14-1147-000](#)

**Markets Committee Presentations**  
*NCPC Redesign*

[10/8/2013 Agenda Item 2 presentations](#)

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *Day-Ahead Market (DAM) Supply Offers*

### Today:

- Supply Offer submittal is constant for 24 hours of the DAM
  - Identical values of Start-Up, No-Load, Incremental Energy (MW/Price pairs or Bid Slope) are offered for all 24 hours

### Offer Flexibility:

- Supply Offer submittal can specify different values during the DAM
  - Up to 24 hourly values for Start-Up, No Load, Incremental Energy allowed
  - Dual fuel units can specify different fuel type by hour
  - Incremental Energy method can vary



# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *Real-Time Market (RTM) Supply Offers*

### Today:

- Supply Offer submittal is constant for 24 hours of the Operating Day
  - Identical values of Start-Up, No-Load, Incremental Energy (MW/Price pairs or Bid Slope) are offered for all 24 hours
  - Participant can update its RTM offer during the re-offer period after the DAM has cleared
    - Re-offer period usually concludes at 2:00 p.m. on the day before the operating day

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *Real-Time Market Supply Offers*

### Offer Flexibility

- 
- Supply Offer submittal can specify different values
    - Up to 24 hourly values for Start-up, No-Load, and Incremental Energy
    - Dual fuel units can specify different fuel type by hour
    - Incremental Energy method can vary
  - In Real-Time, New Supply Offer for an hour can be submitted up to 30 minutes in advance of the hour
    - New RT offer can specify varying values for subsequent hours

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *Supply Offers: Advantage of Flexible Offers*

- Generator owners can reflect the true cost of fuel in the offers
- Today, supply offers are submitted one day before the operating day
- With offer flexibility, supply offers can reflect changes in the costs of procuring fuel in real time
- Locational Marginal Prices will reflect real cost of fuel, providing better market signals



# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *High Level Concepts – Settlement Considerations*

- The Energy Market settlement rules and mechanics are not impacted by the Energy Market Offer Flexibility changes
  - All generation is still compensated at LMP
  - Supply offers are not considered in the settlement
- Today, the NCPC evaluation determines if a generator has recovered its costs through the energy settlement at LMP
  - NCPC provides “make whole” payment to a generator following ISO dispatch instructions, if revenue at LMP does not fully compensate the cost of generation based on the generator’s supply offer

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility (EMOF) & NCPC Redesign

## *NCPC Overview - Principles*

- Existing NCPC rules are incompatible with Offer Flexibility
  - Existing rules based on one offer (Start Up, No-Load, Incremental energy) for all 24 hours of the operating day
- New Market Design for NCPC determination
  - Hourly Offers
  - Intraday hourly offers
  - Negative offers

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *New Principle for NCPC Payments*

- Replace “make whole” concept with “no worse off principle”
- Ensure Market Participants are compensated for an inappropriate financial loss, relative to the “best alternative”, when following ISO instructions

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *New NCPC Concepts & Terms: NCPC Settlement Period*

- Replaces operating day as the period for NCPC calculations
- Corresponds to commitment duration for non-fast start units
  - Commitments that are not contiguous will have separate settlement periods
- Credit calculation performed separately for each period; profitable periods do not subsidize losses
  - Market Participant is “not worse off” for following dispatch in unprofitable period
    - Profits don’t net out losses in the different periods
- Fast Start Units are evaluated hourly; profits in any hour do not net out losses in another hour

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *New NCPC Concepts & Terms: Cumulative Profit Determination*

- Performed after Minimum Run Time has elapsed
- Determine hour in which cumulative profit is maximized. Calculate NCPC to recover forgone profit when generator is not shut down by the ISO at the end of this hour
  - The Market Participant will recover the foregone profit, thus “no worse off” for staying online

### Example:

Hour	Revenue – Cost Calculation	Cumulative Profit
10	\$1000	\$1000
11	\$500	\$1500
12	-\$100	\$1400
13	-\$200	\$1200
Maximum Profit		\$1500
Cumulative Profit:		\$1200
NCPC Payment:		\$300

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *NCPC Overview - Principles*

- More Precision in Cost Allocation
  - Replace hourly allocations based on total pool load with allocation to the generator's unprofitable hours only

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *“High Level” Example*


- Conceptual overview
  - Current NCPC methodology
  - NCPC redesign methodology
- Many new concepts and rules in NCPC redesign
- Overview today to illustrate broad differences using a single example
  - Commitment and Dispatch in Real-Time only
  - Provide context for upcoming changes in Settlement mechanics and Settlement MIS reporting

# Generator XYZ Commitment and Dispatch

NCPC Calculations Today

Single Supply Offer for All Hours of Day

Start-Up/No-Load/Incremental Energy



## Calculate NCPC Credit

- Revenues at LMP
- Costs at Supply Offer

All Hours of Day are  
Netted Together

If Cost > Revenue:

$$\text{NCPC} = \text{Cost} - \text{Revenue}$$

✓ Allocate Costs Based on Hourly Total Pool Load

# Generator XYZ Commitment and Dispatch

## NCPC Calculations – Offer Flexibility


EcoMin 100 MW →

<b>Commitment #2</b> <i>Commitment Reason: 1<sup>st</sup> Contingency Protection</i>				<b>Commitment #1</b> <i>Commitment Reason: Voltage Support (VAR)</i>			
6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00	10:00	11:00	12:00	13:00
RAA 2:00 am on Operating Day				RAA 5:00 pm on Day Prior to Operating Day			
<b>Commitment Decision 2 (CD #2)</b>				<b>Commitment Decision 1 (CD #1)</b>			
Effective Offer for Commitment (EOC)				Effective Offer for Commitment (EOC)			
Startup / No Load / Incremental Energy at Economic Minimum				Startup / No Load / Incremental Energy at Economic Minimum			



# Generator XYZ Commitment and Dispatch

## NCPC Calculations – Offer Flexibility



EOC: Effective Offer for Commitment  
 EOD: Effective Offer for Dispatch

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *“High Level” Example – Calculation Information*

- To augment the high level concepts, a table of calculations is provided for review purposes
- Calculations are presented in an informal format, tailored specifically for this example

### Commitment #2

#### Effective Offer for Commitment

Start-Up Cost	\$1000
No-Load Cost	\$500
Incremental Energy to Economic Minimum	\$48

### Commitment #1

#### Effective Offer for Commitment

Start-Up Cost	\$2000
No-Load Cost	\$1000
Incremental Energy to Economic Minimum	\$54

#### MIN RUN TIME (MRT)

	6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00
LMP (\$/MWh)	51	51	50	60
EOD to 110 MW (\$/MWh)	52	52	52	62
EOD to 105 MW (\$/MWh)	50	50	50	61

#### POST MIN RUN TIME

	10:00	11:00	12:00	13:00
LMP (\$/MWh)	85	75	44	49
EOD to 110 MW (\$/MWh)	58	58	59	59
EOD to 105 MW (\$/MWh)	55	55	56	56

Start-Up Cost(1)	\$250	\$250	\$250	\$250
No-Load Cost	\$500	\$500	\$500	\$500
Incremental Energy to Economic Minimum	\$4,800	\$4,800	\$4,800	\$4,800
Incremental Energy to Economic Dispatch Point	\$250	\$250	\$250	\$0
Total Cost	\$5,800	\$5,800	\$5,800	\$5,550
Revenue at Economic Dispatch Point	\$5,355	\$5,355	\$5,250	\$6,000
Profit/Loss	-\$445	-\$445	-\$550	\$450
Net Profit/Loss				-\$990
Commitment NCPC				\$990
Incremental Energy to Dispatch Point	\$260	\$260	\$0	\$0
Revenue for Out of Merit Dispatch	\$255	\$255	\$0	\$0
Profit/Loss	-\$5	-\$5	\$0	\$0
Dispatch NCPC				\$10

Start-Up Cost	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
No-Load Cost	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$1,000
Incremental Energy to Economic Minimum	\$5,400	\$5,400	\$5,400	\$5,400
Incremental Energy to 105 MW	\$275	\$275	\$0	\$0
Incremental Energy to 110 MW	\$290	\$290	\$0	\$0
Total Cost	\$6,965	\$6,965	\$6,400	\$6,400
Revenue at Dispatch Point	\$9,350	\$8,250	\$4,400	\$4,900
Profit	\$2,385	\$1,285	-\$2,000	-\$1,500
Cumulative Profit	\$2,385	\$3,670	\$1,670	\$170
Maximum Profit		\$3,670		
Post MRT NCPC				\$3,500

Commitment NCPC Cost Allocator	30.9%	30.9%	38.2%	0.0%
Commitment NCPC Cost Allocation	\$306	\$306	\$378	\$0
Dispatch NCPC Cost Allocation	\$5	\$5	\$0	\$0
Total MRT Cost Allocation	\$311	\$311	\$378	\$0

Post MRT Cost Allocator			57.14%	42.86%
Post MRT Cost Allocation			\$2,000	\$1,500

(1) Start-Up amortized through the end of the Commitment Decision period in which the MRT ended.

# Energy Market Offer Flexibility & NCPC Redesign

## *“High Level” Example*

- ISO will be providing training on Offer Flexibility and NCPC Settlement (Summer 2014)
- Note that every DA and RT NCPC Market Information Server (MIS) settlement report will be retired
  - All new MIS reports for NCPC redesign
  - Divisional Accounting included in new reports



# RECENT MARKET CHANGES – UPDATE



- Winter 2013/14 Reliability Program

# Winter 2013/14 Reliability Program

## *Settlement Schedule, including Resettlements*



Program Operating Month	Program Charges Billing Month	Program Credits Billing Month	Penalty Settlements, As Applicable Billing Month	Data Reconciliation Process (DRP) Resettlement Billing Month
December 2013	January 2014	February 2014	February 2014	May 2014
January 2014	February 2014	March 2014	March 2014	June 2014
February 2014	March 2014	April 2014	April 2014	July 2014



- Program Charges are billed to Participants with Real Time Load Obligation (RTLO)
  - \$25 Million/Month for each of the three Winter Reliability Program months (Dec – Feb)
- Program Credits are paid to Participants providing Winter Reliability Service
- Program Penalties are settled as follows:
  - If a Winter Reliability Service provider incurred penalties, provider is charged for those penalties
  - Penalties are paid to Participants who were charged for the program operating month
- DRP Resettlements will reflect any changes in RTLO values



# DIVISIONAL ACCOUNTING



- *Project Recap*
- *Schedule*
- *Implementation Detail: Reserve Market Failure to Reserve Cost Allocation*

# Divisional Accounting Recap

- ISO's current settlement system provides **one** account for each Market Participant
- Market Participants requested a Divisional Accounting option
- ISO New England is working on software enhancements to fulfill this request
  - Settlement MIS reports will be augmented with a new section detailing the report activity in Participant defined subaccounts
  - Subaccount activities will “roll up” and total to the same values published in the current settlement reports



*[Download materials from the September 2012 \(Q3\) Settlement Issues Forum for a complete overview of this topic.](#)*

# Implementation Plan

## *Account management in CAMS*

**Phase 1  
(Q1 2014)** CAMS Subaccount Management available  
Implemented: March 6, 2014

**WebEx training for  
CAMS Subaccount Management**

[February 26, 2014 Session Materials](#)

[CAMS User Guide for Company and Affiliate Maintenance](#)






# Divisional Accounting

## *Notes on Implementation*

- CAMS is now available for Subaccount management
- Phase 2 release for Divisional Accounting will include the subaccounts in some settlement reporting; asset assignment to subaccounts will be reflected in these reports
  - Energy/Regulation/Reserves
  - Transitional Demand Response
  - Black Start
- Note that Phase 2 settlement reporting does not include activity assignment to subaccounts
- Activities that will not be reflected in subaccounts include
  - Day Ahead Cleared Demand Bids
  - Day Ahead Cleared Virtual Transactions (Incremental Offers (“Inc’s”) and Decremental Bids (“Dec’s”))
  - Internal and External Transactions
  - Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
- Note that Participants can set up Subaccounts in CAMS without enabling reporting

# Implementation Plan

## Projected Schedule



*This schedule may be modified to accommodate competing priorities.*

# Divisional Accounting

## *Implementation Detail*

- ISO will implement rules to ensure that cost allocation is not affected by Divisional Accounting
- Costs with tiered rates or netting across dimensions will be allocated among subaccounts using a pro-rata approach
  - NCPC Load Obligation Deviations
  - Forward Reserve Market Failure to Reserve
  - ISO Tariff tiered costs and non-zero ANI transaction units
- The rule for allocation of Forward Reserve Market (FRM) Failure to Reserve penalties will be reviewed today

# Divisional Accounting

## *Implementation Detail: Forward Reserve Market (FRM) Failure to Reserve*

- A Participant with an FRM obligation incurs Failure to Reserve penalties in any hour where FRM delivery is less than FRM obligation
- There are scenarios where the ISO would not be able to attribute the penalties to a subaccount
  - Participant did not assign enough MW to meet its obligation
    - Which Subaccount “at fault”? Unknown
  - Participant overassigns MW to meet its obligation; but delivery falls short
    - Which Subaccount “at fault”? Unknown
- Since the ISO cannot determine which subaccount is responsible for the Failure-to-Reserve penalties, all Failure-to-Reserve penalties will be reported in the Default Account
  - Participant can determine correct allocation in-house for these penalties



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

*Settlement Issues Forum Dates for 2014*



# Settlements Issues Forum Dates



- Q2 meeting: Friday, June 13 at 10:00 AM
- Q3 meeting: Friday, September 12 at 10:00 AM
- Q4 meeting: Thursday, December 11 at 10:00 AM



